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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an " Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Denying Defendants7 Counter Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment/7 ("Order77) entered by the Second District Court of 
Davis County (R. at 633-35). The Supreme Court granted the Appellant's Petition 
for Interlocutory Appeal on February 11,2010 (R. at 651-53). 
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon the Supreme Court of Utah 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j)(2009) and because the Order from 
which Defendants are appealing is an order of a court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue: Whether under Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65,52 P.3d 1190, Flake v. 
Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 R3d 589, and Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78,169 P.3d 750, a 
settlor of a revocable trust must revoke the trust, rather than simply amend the 
trust, in order to completely divest a beneficiary of its status as a remainder 
beneficiary when the language of the trust reserves to the settlor the right to 
amend or revoke the trust, but specifies that the interests of the beneficiaries are 
presently vested and will continue until the trust is revoked or terminated other 
than by death. This issue is sometimes referred to hereafter as the "Banks issue.77 
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Standard of Review and Supporting Authority: Correctness, as stated in 
Appellant Randy Patterson's ("Randy") brief. As statecjl by Randy, "So long as 
the reviewing court confines its analysis to the language of the trust instrument 
and does not resort to extrinsic evidence of intent, the interpretation of a trust is 
an issue of law/7 (Brief of Randy at 2). The substance of Randy's brief, however, 
inappropriately strays from analysis of the language of the trust instrument to 
consider extrinsic evidence, which evidence the trial cqurt ruled was irrelevant to 
the proper analysis. (R. at 625 n.3). Randy has not argued on appeal that such 
extrinsic evidence is relevant to the Banks issue. Nor has Randy argued that any 
of the factual findings by the trial court are incorrect. Nonetheless, Randy resorts 
to extrinsic evidence to build an argument relating to the "intent of the settlor" 
and to claim that "injustice" will result from the trial court's Order. As discussed 
below, however, Randy has not attempted to show th^t it preserved in the trial 
court, nor has Randy in fact preserved in the trial court any issue which would 
make relevant his resort to extrinsic evidence. 
The reviewing court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any 
ground available to the trial court, even if it was not retried upon below. Bailey v. 
Boyles, 2002 UT 58, f 10, 52 P.3d 1158; Higgins v. Salt Wee County, 855 P.2d 231, 
235 (Utah 1993). A correlative principle does not exist] to allow a reviewing court 
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to reverse a grant of summary judgment on any ground. Bailey, 2002 UT 58, f 13 
n.3, 52 P.3d 1158 ("While we acknowledge the existence and validity of the 
'affirm on any ground7 rule of appellate review, we caution that it is a tool 
available only in limited circumstances. It certainly is limited to affirming 
decisions on alternate grounds and does not give appellate courts permission to 
search the record for alternate grounds to reverse a decision/') (emphasis in 
original) (citing Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 461 P.2d 290,, 293 n.2 (Utah 
1969)). 
Citation to the Record Showing that the Issue was Preserved in the Trial 
Court: The Banks issue was preserved in the pleadings of the parties before the 
trial court. (R. at 326-35,422-36,442-57, 625-28). 
No other issues were preserved in the trial court, nor has Randy attempted 
to show that any other issues were preserved in the trial court. Rule 24(a)(5), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, clearly states that the brief of the appellant 
"shall contain . . . a statement of the issues presented for review .. . and citation to 
the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or a statement 
of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court/7 
(emphasis added). 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be 
8 
raised on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11,10 |P.3d 346 (citing State v. 
Marvin, 964 P.2d 313,318 (Utah 1998)); Cannon v. Salt Lake Reg'l Med. Or., Inc., 
2005 UT App 352, f 6 n.4,121 P.3d 74. "The preservation rule applies to every 
claim, including constitutional questions, unless [the appellant] can demonstrate 
that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 
74, f 11,10 P.3d 346 (citing Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1)017,1022 (Utah 1996); 
State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,1113 (Utah 1994)). Where an appellant fails to 
provide a "statement of grounds for seeking review of &n issue not preserved in 
the trial court/' which statement would identify and sulbstantiate an exception to 
the preservation rule, an appellate court properly declijnes to address the merits 
of any possible exception. State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 6H, t 21,167 P.3d 1046. In 
addition, potential exceptions to the preservation rule tnay not be argued for the 
first time in a reply brief. Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, H 7-9,17 P.3d 1122. 
The exceptional-circumstances exception "applies primarily to rare 
procedural anomalies." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 , f 12,10 P.3d 346 (quoting State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1209 n.3 (Utah 1993)). The "plainj error" exception requires 
demonstration that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error shdmld have been obvious to 
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent] the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
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differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." Id. at f 13 (quoting 
Dunn, 850 R2d at 1208-09); see also The Berkshires, LLC v. Sykes, 2005 UT App 
536, f 21,127 P.3d 1243. 
Randy can only cite to the record to show that the Banks issue was 
preserved in the trial court. Randy did not provide a statement of grounds for 
seeking review of other issues not preserved in the trial court. Accordingly, no 
issue other than the Banks issue is properly before this Court. Randy 
inappropriately presents at least the following unpreserved issues (and any 
related issues) to this Court: 
1) Whether "the Utah Legislature has effectively overruled Banks by 
requiring only substantial compliance to amend a revocable trust." 
(Brief of Randy at 12,13,16,19-20,22,23, 24-26); and 
2) Whether the Utah Legislature has effectively overruled Banks by 
providing that a revocable trust can be amended by a settlor by any 
method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's 
intent. (Brief of Randy at 13,16,19-20, 22, 23,24-26. 
These issues were not argued or briefed by the parties in the trial court below 
and accordingly should not be addressed by this Court. Appellee Ron Patterson 
("Ron") did not have an opportunity to present facts and arguments relating to 
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these issues to the trial court. The trial court dia not nave an opportunity to 
consider the issues or the facts Ron would have presented or the arguments of 
both parties relative to the issues. The preservation rule prevents an appellant 
from holding back certain issues below, only to ambusfy the successful party 
below with the retained but previously unheard issues, 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS (pF LAW 
The cases which are determinative or of central importance to this appeal 
are Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65,52 P.3d 1190, Flake v. mice, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 
589, and Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78,169 R3d 750. l|he statutes referenced by 
Randy, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 (2009) and Utah Cope Ann. § 75-7-606 (2009) 
are not of determinative or of central importance to thi£ appeal for two equally-
significant reasons. First, as discussed above, the issued relating to these statutes 
were not preserved below and therefore may not be h^ard on appeal; nor has 
Randy attempted to show any exceptional circumstanqes or plain error which 
would justify departure from the preservation rule. Sections 75-7-605 and -606 
are therefore in no way determinative of the issue before this Court. 
Second, except as to certain specified provisions^ the terms of the Uniform 
Trust Code, as adopted by Utah, do not override the language of the trust 
instrument. Sections 75-7-605 and -606 are not override provisions and are 
therefore secondary to the plain language of a trust agreement, the proper 
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interpretation of which is evidenced by Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190, 
Flake v. Rake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589, and Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78,169 P.3d 
750. The verbatim recitation of the relevant provisions of the Utah Trust Code 
follows below. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105 (2009). Default and mandatory rules. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, this 
chapter governs the duties and powers of a trustee, relations among 
trustees, and the rights and interests of a beneficiary. 
(2) Except as specifically provided in this chapter, the terms of a 
trust prevail over any provision of this chapter except: 
(a) the requirements for creating a trust; 
(b) the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance 
with the purposes of the trust; 
(c) the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of 
its beneficiaries; 
(d) the power of the court to modify or terminate a trust under 
Sections 75-7-410 through 75-7-416; 
(e) the effect of a spendthrift provision, Section 26-6-14, and the 
rights of certain creditors and assignees to reach a trust as provided 
in Part 5, Creditor's Claims-Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts; 
(f) the power of the court under Section 75-7-702 to require, 
dispense with, or modify or terminate a bond; 
(g) the effect of an exculpatory term under Section 75-7-1008; 
(h) the rights under Sections 75-7-1010 through 75-7-1013 of a 
person other than a trustee or beneficiary; 
(i) periods of limitation for commencing a judicial proceeding; 
and 
(j) the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court and venue for 
commencing a proceeding as provided in Sections 75-7-203 and 75-7-
205. 
Section 75-7-105(2) specifically and exclusively identifies those provisions of the 
Utah Trust Code which override the terms of a trust. As to all other aspects of 
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the trust, the terms of the trust prevail; the provisions of the Utah Trust Code are 
simply default rules which apply when the trust terms do not speak to a given 
question. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-105(2) does not reference Sections 75-7-605 and 
-606 and the provisions contained therein relating to th<p modification by a settlor 
of a revocable trust. The terms of a trust relating to the trust's amendment, 
modification, or divestment of beneficiaries therefore pjrevail over the provisions 
of Sections 75-7-605 and -606. Sections 75-7-605 and -606 are therefore in no way 
determinative of the issue before this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASft 
Nature of the case: Randy correctly states that tfyis action concerns the 
interpretation of trust documents. The referred-to trusf: documents include what 
the trial court referred to as the "Family Trust/' the "First Amendment/7 the 
"Restatement/7 and the "Final Amendment." (R. at 62^-24). Under the terms of 
each of the Family Trust, First Amendment, and Restatement, Ron and each of 
his 6 siblings would receive a distribution of the trust's property upon the death 
of Ron and Randy's mother, Darlene Patterson ("Darlqne"). (R. at 623-24). 
Under the terms of the Final Amendment, Ron would not receive any 
distribution of the trust's property. (R. at 624). 
The terms of both the Family Trust and the Restatement permit Darlene to 
modify and/or revoke the trust, but then go on to specify that the interests of the 
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beneficiaries are present interests and that such interests "shall continue until this 
Trust is revoked or terminated/7 (R. at 627). The question is whether the trial 
court and the Utah Supreme Court are correct in interpreting such trust language 
to require that complete divestment of a beneficiary's interest may only be 
accomplished through a revocation of the trust, not merely through an 
amendment which attempts to accomplish the complete divestment. 
Randy inappropriately refers to facts which are not relevant to the issue 
before this Court, as held by the trial court below. (R. at 625 n.3). These are facts 
which Ron vigorously objected to in the trial court below, particularly through a 
Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Randy Patterson ("Motion to 
Strike"). (R. at 459-70). Randy briefed the issue and submitted a "Supplemental 
and Corrected Affidavit of Randy Patterson." (hereinafter "Affidavit of Randy"). 
(R. at 490-92; 473-84). Ron further objected to the contents of the Affidavit of 
Randy. (R. at 493-501). The trial court, however, neither granted nor denied the 
Motion to Strike, because it believed that the Affidavit of Randy was irrelevant to 
its ruling on the motion for summary judgment. The trial court stated: 
In reviewing the Supplemental and Corrected Affidavit of Randy 
Patterson, and given the parties7 stipulation to limit the issues 
pertaining to their cross motions for partial summary judgment and 
the relevant Utah appellate case law of such issues, the Court agrees 
with the plaintiff that the information within the affidavit is largely 
irrelevant to the Court's analysis. 
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(R- at 625 n.3). Accordingly, the trial court's ruling did\not incorporate or 
reference any of the facts which Randy now presents. |R. at 622-29). These facts 
are found throughout Randy's Brief. (Brief of Randy at 3-4, 9-10,11,26-27, 31-32). 
Randy has failed to argue that the trial court contmitted error in holding 
that the facts in his Affidavit are irrelevant to the Banks] issue, or that there are 
exceptional circumstances requiring the inclusion of the facts in his Affidavit for 
consideration by this Court If Randy were to persuadie this Court that the facts 
in his Affidavit are indeed relevant, he would still run afoul in presenting such 
facts to this Court because he cannot show that such facts were admissible below. 
Indeed, if for whatever reason the facts in the Affidavit of Randy were 
considered admissible by this Court, the mootness of tjie Motion to Strike below 
would dissolve and that motion would stand as a bar ifo the admissibility of the 
Affidavit of Randy. 
Course of proceedings: In addition to the procedural history recited in 
Randy's Brief, the Motion to Strike is of critical significance, as discussed 
immediately above. 
Disposition in the court below: The Order and filling attacked by Randy 
herein granted the relief requested by Ron below, which sought a holding "that a 
certain 'Final Amendment' executed by the Parties' mother on May 30,2006 is 
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void as a matter of law" due to its complete divestment of Ron's interest in the 
trust's property without a revocation of the prior trust instruments. (R. at 633-
34). The trial court's Ruling included a recitation of undisputed material facts, 
brief procedural history, and analysis of the issue presented. (R. at 622-29). The 
trial court's Ruling stated: 
[T]he Final Amendment clearly did not revoke the Family Trust or 
the Restatement, as is required by the documents' plain language to 
effectuate a complete divestment. Consequently, and in accord with 
the Utah Supreme Court's precedent in Banks, 52 P.3d 1190, Flake, 71 
P.3d 589, and Hoggan, 169 P.3d 750, the Court must find that the 
Final Amendment is invalid based upon Darlene Patterson's failure 
to comply with the Family Trust's and the Restatements terms for 
completely divesting a beneficiary's vested interest in the trust's 
Property. The Court must, therefore, GRANT the plaintiffs motion 
for partial summary judgment, and DENY the defendants' counter 
motion for partial summary judgment. 
(R. at 628). 
Statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review: The facts 
which the trial court considered relevant to the Banks issue, and which have not 
been challenged by Randy, are as follows (with quotation from the Ruling as 
appropriate): 
1. On July 30,1999, Darlene Patterson and Rex. E. Patterson executed, and 
thus, created The Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust (herein, the "Family 
Trust"). (R. at 623). 
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2. The stated purpose of the Family Trust is "fori the primary benefit of the 
Undersigned during the Undersigned's lifetime, [and] for the Undersigned's 
family thereafter." (R. at 623). 
3. Moreover, the Family Trust provides that "[tjjie interests of the 
beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to divestment which shall 
continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated othe? than by death/' (R. at 
623). 
4. However, the Family Trust also provides that[, "[a]s long as the 
Undersigned is alive, the Undersigned reserves the rigjht to amend, modify or 
revoke this Trust in whole or in part, including the priticipal, and the present or 
past undisbursed income from such principal/' (R. at 623). 
5. On May 31,2000, Darlene Patterson execute^ an amendment to the 
Family Trust (herein, the "First Amendment"), which provided Plaintiff Ron 
Patterson additional property upon the distribution of the trust's property. (R. at 
623). 
6. Subsequently, on March 12, 2001, Darlene Patterson executed a 
restatement of the Family Trust (herein, the "Restatement"), which, among other 
things, provided Plaintiff Ron Patterson with an additional specific devise and 
reduced the beneficiary interest of Defendants Gary Ej Patterson, Judy Ann 
17 
Henry, and Rex A. Patterson. (R. at 624). 
7. Additionally, the Restatement included similar provisions regarding the 
Family Trust's revocability and the presently vested interests of the trust's 
beneficiaries: "The interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest which shall 
continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated." (R. at 624, 627). 
8. Thereafter, on May 30,2006, Darlene Patterson executed another 
amendment to the Family Trust (herein, the "Final Amendment"), which 
effectively removed Plaintiff Ron Patterson as a beneficiary of the trust, stating: "I 
have intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or his 
descendants) since I have already properly provided for this son during his 
lifetime as I felt was appropriate." (R. at 624). 
9. Darlene Patterson died on April 30,2007. (R. at 624). 
No additional facts are relevant to the issue presented for review. 
Randy's Brief contains twenty (20) numbered paragraphs under the 
heading "Statement of Undisputed Facts." Rule 24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, calls for a "statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review . . . . All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall 
be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule." (emphasis added). Randy inappropriately asserts that the recited facts are 
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"undisputed," and that they are relevant. Ron does not concur in the 
characterization of such facts as being "undisputed." Ron additionally responds 
to certain of the recited facts as follows: 
Randy's Paragraph 12: During the time when Ron was living with Darlene Patterson, 
Ron unlawfully used Darleners credit card without authorization to make personal 
purchases including four-wheelers for his business, [citation omitted], Ron made many of 
these purchases online through Ebay and PayPal [citation Emitted], When Darlene 
discovered that tliese transactions had taken place, she objected and notified PayPal that 
Ron had no authority to use her credit card, [citation omitted]. 
Randy's Paragraph 13: In or about February of 2006, Darlene Patterson received a check 
from the State of California in the amount of '$52,936,53 payable to Darlene for a project 
involving real property which Darlene owned in California. fcitation omitted], Ron, 
however, stole the check, forged Darlene's signature, cashed \the clteck, and used the check 
funds for his personal benefit without Darlene rs knowledge (pr permission, [citation 
omitted]. Eventually, Ron's conduct was discovered, and Rpn was convicted of the felony 
crimes of "Elder Abuse" and "Exploitation of an Elder." [citation omitted]. In 
connection with his conviction, Ron was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of 
$52,936.53, and was sentenced to jail and probation, [citation omitted]. 
Randy's Paragraph 14: After Darlene discovered Ron's wrongdoings indentified in 
paragraphs 13-14 above, she asked Mr. Carver, her attorney at the time, to prepare 
19 
another Amendment to tlte Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust, [citation 
omitted]. 
The assertions of paragraphs 12 through 14 exactly correspond to the 
assertions of paragraphs 4 through 6 of the Affidavit of Randy, (R. at 474), which 
the trial court held were largely irrelevant to the issue briefed by Ron and Randy. 
(R. at 625 n.3). As a result, the trial court did not rule on the Motion to Strike. If 
Randy were to persuade this Court that the facts in his Affidavit are indeed 
relevant, he would still run afoul in presenting such facts to this Court because he 
cannot show that such facts were admissible below. Rule 24(e), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, provides that "If reference is made to evidence the 
admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of 
the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or 
rejected/7 Randy failed to reference the pages of the record at which the trial 
court rejected this evidence as being largely irrelevant. In addition, the Motion to 
Strike below stands as a barrier to Randy's attempt to skew the simple facts 
relevant to the issue before this Court. 
Each of paragraphs 12 through 14 of Randy's "Statement of Undisputed 
Facts" were vigorously objected to by Ron in his Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Randy Patterson. (R. at 493-501). 
These objections were based on, among others, the hearsay rule, the prohibition 
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against conclusory statements and statements lacking fbundation, and relevance. 
(R. at 496-99). Paragraphs 12 through 14 of Randy's "Statement of Undisputed 
Facts'7 should be stricken and ignored by this Court. 
Randy's Paragraph 15: On or about May 30, 2006, Darlene\ Patterson executed another 
amendment to the Family Trust (tJte "Pinal Amendment"), which was intended to 
effectively remove Ron as a beneficiary of the trust.... [citation omitted]. 
This paragraph does not appear to make an assertion as to the actual 
"intent" of Darlene, but Ron objects to the paragraph to the extent that it is so 
construed. The trial court below made no finding as to the intent of the settlor. 
The trial court's analysis and the arguments of Ron and Randy before it were 
limited to the Banks issue; i.e. whether the settlor of a revocable trust must revoke 
the trust, rather than simply amend the trust, to completely divest a beneficiary 
of its interest when the language of the trust reserves to the settlor the right to 
amend or revoke the trust, but specifies that the interests of the beneficiaries will 
continue until the trust is revoked or terminated other dian by death. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court and this Court are correct: when the plain language of trust 
documents state that the remainder interest of a beneficiary "shall continue until 
this Trust is revoked or terminated/' revocation of the trust as a whole is required 
in order to completely eliminate a beneficiary's interest. The Family Trust and 
Restatement contain this operative language. Accordingly, the trial court held 
that because the settlor herein attempted to completely divest Ron of his interest 
through an amendment, not a revocation, the amendment was void. 
When a settlor creates a revocable trust, legal title to the trust property 
vests in the designated trustee, who then has a duty to deal with the property in 
accordance with the terms of the trust agreement. After legal title vests in the 
trustee, the settlor only retains such interest in the trust property as is designated 
in the trust agreement. A valid trust, however, requires that the same person is 
not the trustee and sole beneficiary. A beneficiary other than the settlor/trustee 
must exist, which means that such other beneficiary must have some 
recognizable interest. Once a trust is created, a settlor only has such power to 
revoke or amend the trust agreement as is reserved in the trust agreement. 
With these basic trust principles in mind, the rule announced by this Court 
in Banks and applied in Flake and Hoggan is easily understood. When these 
principles are ignored, however, litigants take issue with the holding of Banks, 
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arguing that it should be overruled because it ignores the "intent of the settlor/' 
Such a position, in addition to disregarding the principles and premises 
underlying trusts, also fails to recognize that the prior ^nd controlling intent of 
the settlor is manifested in her plain language requiring that complete divestment 
of a beneficiary's interest may only occur through revocation of the trust. To give 
meaning to the plain language of a trust's terms does nfc>t exalt form over 
substance; it heeds the substance embodied in the trust| terms. 
Utah Code Annotated Sections 75-7-605 and -600 are not properly before 
this Court, having been raised for the first time on appeal without proffer of any 
justification for so doing. In addition, those statutory provisions are expressly 
made subsidiary to the terms of the trust. Moreover, tljiose statutory provisions 
would not alter the trial court's reasoning, for nothing ^herein turns the Final 
Amendment, which is an amendment in both form and substance, into a 
revocation. To amend is different than to revoke, and \he plain language of the 
Family Trust and Restatement require that in order to completely divest a 
beneficiary's interest, the trust must be revoked. 
Therefore, the plain language of the Family Tru^t and Restatement control, 
making the Final Amendment invalid. This result is mandated by the sound 
reasoning which underlies and is evidenced by this Court's rulings. 
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE CASE LAW UPON WHICH THE TRIAL 
COURT RELIED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GOOD LAW AND SHOULD 
BE FOLLOWED. 
The trial court was correct in ruling that the Final Amendment executed by 
Darlene was void as a matter of law, as it attempted to completely divest Ron of 
his beneficial interest in the trust property without affecting a revocation of the 
trust instrument. The terms of the Family Trust and Restatement, which terms 
were created by Darlene herself, mandated the result reached by the trial court, 
especially in light of the holdings of Banks v. Means, Flake v. Flake, and Hoggan v. 
Hoggan. 
A. Nothing new is properly before this Court. 
Randy correctly states that these precedents deal with trust language 
similar to that contained in the Family Trust. Of particular note, however, is that 
the relevant language in the Family Trust is identical to the relevant language 
addressed in Banks v. Means. (R. at 332, Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary judgment) (comparing the language of the trust in 
Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, f 4,52 P.3d 1190, with the language of the Family 
Trust, | 3.2 (R. at 15)). The relevant language in the Restatement is very similar 
to the relevant language addressed in Flake v. Flake. Compare Restatement, Arts. 
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II. and V.B. (R. at 42-43) ("The interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest 
which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or termjinated/'), with Hoggan v. 
Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, f 2,169 P.3d 750 ("The interest of f[he beneficiaries is a 
present interest which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated 
other than by death/'). In short, nothing new is before ttiis Court: it has already 
encountered identical language as is found in the Family Trust (in Banks v. Means) 
and addressed very similar language as is found in the Restatement (in Hoggan v. 
Hoggan). 
In addition, the attorney who assisted in the execution of the Restatement 
and Final Amendment in this matter, David Ray Carver, either knew or should 
have known about the Banks issue. That same attorney, David Ray Carver, 
assisted with the execution of the Flake Restatement, v^hich was executed on 
October 30,1998. See Brief for Appellee at Addendum [I, at 3,17, Flake v. Flake, 
2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589 (attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit 1). David Ray 
Carver also assisted with the execution of the Restatement relevant to this case, 
which was executed on March 12,2001. (R. at 42, 56). Qie Utah Supreme Court's 
opinion in Flake v. Flake was filed no later than May 2, £003. 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 
589. David Ray Carver also assisted in the execution qt the Final Amendment 
relevant to this case, which was executed on May 30,3006. (R. at 61). Analysis of 
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Banks, Flake, and Hoggan follows. 
B. Banks v. Means, Flake v. Flake, and Hoggan v. Hoggan properly focus on the 
plain language of the trust and the respective results follow accordingly. 
The Banks case came before the Utah Supreme Court after the trial court 
granted the Banks children's motion for summary judgment, the Banks children 
having contested their relegation, by an amendment executed by the settlor prior 
to her death, from the position of primary beneficiaries to that of secondary 
beneficiaries. 2002 UT 65, f 5, 52 P.3d 1190. The trial court held "that the 
children's interest in the trust was vested subject to divestiture only through a 
revocation of the trust, that the trust was never revoked, and that the Banks 
children were therefore the sole beneficiaries of the trust and entitled to receive 
disbursement of the trust corpus as set forth in the original trust document/' Id. 
at f 8 . 
Prior to analyzing the relevant trust language in the original trust 
document regarding the settlor's right to amend, modify, or revoke the trust on 
the one hand, and on the other hand the nature of the beneficiary's interests, the 
Court identified certain premises. First, the nature of the interests created by a 
trust arrangement: "[a] trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to 
property is vested in a trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and manage it 
for the benefit of the beneficiaries." Id. at f^ 9 (citations omitted). Second, that 
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once a settlor has created a trust, "he is no longer the oWner of the trust property 
and has only such ability to deal with it as is expressly reserved to him in the 
trust instrument/' Id. (citations omitted). Third, "a settlor has the power to 
modify or revoke a trust only if and to the extent that sluch power is explicitly 
reserved by the terms of the trust/7 Id. (citations omitted). Finally, "the creation 
of a trust involves the transfer of property interests in fhe trust subject-matter to 
the beneficiaries. These interests cannot be taken fronu [the beneficiaries] except 
in accordance with a provision of the trust instrument ^ Id. (citations omitted). 
These premises preceded a two-part inquiry as tjo (1) the powers which the 
settlor reserved for herself and (2) the nature of the beneficial interests created by 
the trust. Id. As to the first part of the inquiry, the Cotirt found that the specific 
language of the original trust document reserved to Mb. Banks the power to 
"amend, modify, or revoke the trust in whole or in pant/7 with changes to be in 
writing, but in the event of a complete revocation,"all j the property in the trust 
was also to be delivered to Ms. Banks." Id. at f 11. Th^ Court noted that this 
latter provision distinguished a revocation from an amendment. Id. Of course, 
revocation is also distinguished from amendment in that only the former 
extinguishes the fiduciary duties under which the trustee performs. An 
amendment merely modifies the specific duties of the Itrustee; revocation 
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terminates the trust and its duties, and the trustee would need to deliver the 
property as directed by the settlor. 
As to the nature of the beneficiary interests created by the trust, the Court 
quoted the following language: 'The interests of the beneficiaries are presently 
vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is 
revoked or terminated other than by death/7 Id. at f 12. The Court found that 
the plain language of the trust required a complete revocation of the trust in 
order to completely divest a beneficiary's interest. Id. at f f 12,14. Indeed, the 
plain language of the trust is not subject to any other interpretation. The quoted 
language from the trust specifically states that the beneficiaries7 interests 
continue until the trust is revoked. 
The Banks Court rejected the argument that the quoted language "merely 
proves that the trust is not illusory and does not restrict Ms. Banks7 rights to 
divest the Banks children of their vested interests.77 Id. at % 13. True enough, "a 
revocable trust can be created, without being deemed illusory, as long as title to 
the property passes to the trustee and vested interests are created in the 
beneficiaries, even if these interests are subject to divestiture.77 Id. (citations 
omitted). In effect, the only language necessary to the creation of a valid trust, 
assuming the trust is elsewhere designated as revocable, is language stating that 
28 
the beneficiaries have a present beneficial interest in tft£ trust as beneficiaries. A 
se.ttlor need not limit her power to completely divest such beneficial interests, but 
when she does so by stating that such interests "shall continue until this Trust is 
revoked/7 the only logical construction of the settlor's pwn limitation is that the 
interests of each and every beneficiary must continue ih some form1 until the 
trust is revoked. 
Randy inappropriately accuses the Utah Suprente Court in its holding in 
Banks of " [giving] no meaning to the express terms of t|he trust allowing for 
partial revocations and partial amendments'7 and of "[Reading] into the trust 
language a requirement that an amendment or partial Revocation could not divest 
a beneficiary's interest." (Brief of Randy at 16). Randy^s disgust with the Utah 
Supreme Court's plain-language reading of the relevant trust provisions seems to 
arise from his failure to consider the aforementioned premises; i.e., once a trust is 
created, a settlor only has such power to deal with the trust property as reserved 
in the trust agreement and only such power to revoke fhe trust agreement as is 
reserved in the trust agreement. Even with the reservation of the right to revoke, 
the settlor is bound by the very trust provisions she created which outline her 
ability to modify or extinguish the interests of the beneficiaries. 
l Even if the interest continues in a modified or amended form. See Flake v. Flake, 
2003 UT17, 71 P.3d 589. 
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In Flake, the Court addressed a situation in which the complaining 
beneficiary's interest was simply modified, not terminated as in Banks. 2003 UT 
17, f 17, 71 P.3d 589. The Court noted a slight difference between the relevant 
language in the Flake trust and the relevant language in the Banks trust. In the 
Flake trust: //rThe interest of the beneficiaries is a present vested interest which 
shall continue until the Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death." Id. at 
117. In the Banks trust: "The interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested 
interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or 
terminated other than by death." Id. (emphasis in Flake). The Court in Flake 
noted the absence of the emphasized Banks language in the Flake trust. It also 
noted that the beneficial interest of the complaining beneficiary was "merely 
amended, and not completely divested as was the case in Banks." Id. As an 
aside, the Court stated that the "purpose and primary effect" of the relevant trust 
language is "to save the Trust from the doctrine of merger and to prove that the 
Trust is not illusory." Id. 
Randy reads Flake as evidencing this Court's attempt to "reduce the 
harshness and inequitable nature of Banks'' and also as showing that the 
"purpose of the language was not to protect the beneficiary's interest from being 
deleted by an amendment, but rather to insure that the revocable living trust was 
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not deemed illusory/7 (Brief of Randy at 17). Neither of these premises is 
expressly stated or implied in Flake. The Court in Flake identified the "purpose 
and primary effect" of such language as being to save tjie trust from the doctrine 
of merger and ensure that a trust is not illusory, but was explicit in stating that if 
a complete divestment had been attempted by the subject amendment, it would 
not have been valid: "there is no requirement of revocation where the beneficial 
interest is simply modified or amended but not terminated." Flake, 2003 UT 17, f^ 
17, 71 R3d 589. As noted above, the latter portion of sijich language; i.e. " . . . 
which shall continue until the Trust is revoked . . . , " id\, has nothing to do with 
saving the trust from the doctrine of merger or ensuring that a trust is not 
illusory. It has the direct effect of limiting the settlor's ability to completely 
divest a beneficiary's interest without revoking the trupt. 
If Flake had been the final word on the subject, tfyere may be some 
confusion as to the meaning and scope of Banks and Flfcke. It is not, however, as 
Hoggan clarifies and reaffirms the rule announced in hunks. In Hoggan, the Court 
addressed the arguments of a beneficiary who had bedn mostly, but not 
completely, divested by amendment of the original triist. 2007 UT 78, % 3,169 
P.3d 750. The Court in Hoggan dealt with trust language similar to that in the 
31 
Restatement in this case,2 and the complaining beneficiary (Jack) argued that his 
near-complete divestiture could not occur by amendment, only by complete 
revocation of the entire trust. The Court disagreed because Jack had not been 
completely divested of his interest. Id. at f 13. 
In an aside, the Hoggan Court noted that trust language which states that 
the beneficiaries have "presently vested interests'7 is surplusage, a remnant of 
times when it was thought that the language was necessary to prevent trusts 
from being considered illusory. Id. at f 11 n.2. The Court cited approvingly of 
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25 reporter's notices, cmt. b, which suggests 
that language stating that beneficiary interests are "present" or "vested" simply 
means that the beneficiaries have "'presently existing' interests." Id. Randy 
concludes that this reasoning undermines the force of Banks because it shows that 
the "purpose of such language had nothing to do with protecting the 
beneficiary's interest from being deleted by an amendment." (Brief of Randy at 
18). 
Initially, Randy misunderstands Banks to the extent that he believes it held 
that the language regarding "presently vested interests" was interpreted as being 
2 "The interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest which shall continue until 
this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death." Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, f 
ll ,169R3d750. 
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intended to protect the beneficiary's interest. The Banks Court did nothing but 
interpret the plain language of the trust document, coghizant of the premises that 
a settlor only has such power to deal with the trust property as reserved in the 
trust agreement and only such power to revoke the tru^t agreement as is 
reserved in the trust agreement. The outcome is entirely within the control of the 
settlor. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, f 14,169 P.3d 750. 
More significant, however, is that the aforementioned aside by the Hoggan 
Court did not deter from the rule announced in Banks. In response to Jack's 
argument that he could not have been divested without a complete revocation of 
the trust agreement, the Court stated that the rule of Bfcnks did not apply because 
Jack Hoggan had not been completely divested of his interest in the trust. Id. at f 13. 
Had Jack been completely divested without complete Revocation of the trust, the 
divestiture would not have been effective. 
The Court's discussion in Hoggan actually undermines Randy's argument, 
because even though the Court stated that trust language identifying 
beneficiaries7 interests as "vested" or "presently vested" was unnecessary, it 
upheld the reasoning of Banks: when a trust states thatf the interests of 
beneficiaries will continue "until this Trust is revoked or terminated," id. at f 11, 
complete divestiture of a beneficiary's interest may onlly occur by complete 
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revocation of the trust agreement. So long as the beneficiary's interest 
"continues" following the amendment—there is "simply a change in the quality, 
or scope, of the beneficial interest" — the amendment is not void. Id. at f 12 
(quoting Flake, 2003 UT17, f 17, 71 P.3d 589). 
The Hoggan Court's willingness to reaffirm the rule announced in Banks, 
notwithstanding the rejection of the idea that a "present" or "vested" interest 
meant anything other than a "presently existing interest," is significant, for it 
makes clear that the operative language is that clause which states that the 
beneficiary's interest "shall continue until the Trust is revoked . . . . " This phrase 
has nothing to do with saving the trust from the doctrine of merger or ensuring 
that a trust is not illusory. It has the direct effect of limiting the settlor's ability to 
completely divest a beneficiary's interest without revoking the trust. 
The following table compares the relevant language from each of Banks, 







The interests of the beneficiaries are 
presently vested interests subject to 
divestment which shall continue 
until this Trust is revoked or 
terminated other than by death.3 
The interest of the beneficiaries is a 
present vested interest which shall 
continue until the Trust is revoked 
or terminated other than by death.4 
The interest of the beneficiaries is a 
present interest which shall 
continue until this Trust is revoked 
or terminated other than by death.5 
1 
Outcome 
Beneficiaries could not be 
completely divested of interest 
withoui revocation of trust. 
Amendment which simply 
modified the beneficiary's 
interest was valid because it did 
not result in a complete 
divestment of the beneficiary's 
interest 
Amendment which simply 
modified the beneficiary's 
interesl - was valid because it did 
not result in a complete 
divestment of the beneficiary's 
interesj: 
Comparison of the relevant language in each of hanks, Flake, and Hoggan 
makes clear that the language which operates to prevent a settlor from 
completely divesting a beneficiary's interest without completely revoking the 
trust is not the language regarding the nature of the beneficiary's interest 
("present" and/or "vested"), it is the language which provides that such interest 
"shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated." Accordingly, the 
Hoggan Court acknowledged that a "present interest" meant nothing more than a 
"presently existing interest." 2007 UT 78,f11 n.2,169 P.3d 750. The issue is not 
3 Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, f 11 n.3,169 P.3d 750 (quoting tfanks). 
4 Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, f 12 n.4,169 R3d 750 (quoting tlake). 
5 Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, \ 11,169 P.3d 750. 
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the nature of the beneficiary's interest, it is the limit which the settlor placed on 
her ability to modify the beneficiary's interest. 
With this in mind, the following table compares two hypothetical trusts: 
one which merely incorporates the "presently existing interest" concept of the 
Restatement (third) of Trusts without removing or modifying the operative 
language, the second hypothetical trust having altered the operative language: 
Source 
Language consistent with 
Restatement (third) of 
Trusts § 25 reporter's 
notices, cmt. b, but 
otherwise similar to 
Banks, Flake, and Hoggan 
Hypothetical language 
Relevant Language 
The interest of the 
beneficiaries is a 
"presently existing 
interest" which shall 
continue until this Trust is 
revoked or terminated other 
than by death.6 
The interest of the 
beneficiaries is a 
"presently existing 
interest" which shall 
continue until any such 
interest is reduced or 





Beneficiaries cannot be 
completely divested of 
interest without 
revocation of trust. 
Would allow the settlor 
to completely divest a 
beneficiary's interest 
without a revocation of 
the trust 
6 The emphasized portion of this hypothetical language is the "operative 
language;" i.e. the language which is interpreted, and can only be interpreted, to 
require that complete divestment of a beneficiary's interest can only be 
accomplished by revocation of the Trust. 
7 The settlor could also completely omit such language, or simply state that "The 
interest of the beneficiaries is a 'presently existing interest.'" 
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In effect, the results in each of Banks, Flake, and Hoggan did not arise from what 
Randy perceives as the unintended consequence of "piiesent interest" language 
which was intended to prevent a trust from being illuspry. (Brief of Randy at 18). 
The "purpose and primary effect," Flake, 2003 UT17,1| 17, 71 P.3d 589, of the 
"present interest" language certainly may have been to prevent a trust from 
being illusory, but the further statement that a beneficiary's interest "shall 
continue until this Trust is revoked" is not necessary tQ that purpose. Yet this 
latter clause has clear meaning: the interest of the beneficiary shall continue until 
the Trust is revoked. Therefore, regardless of the nature of the interest created by 
the phrase "The interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject 
to divestment," Banks, 2002 UT 65, H 4, 52 P.3d 1190, that interest "shall continue 
until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than b} death." Id. 
Such is the case here. As acknowledged by the tjrial court, there is no way 
around the plain language of the Family Trust8 and th$ Restatement.9 
("However, the Final Amendment clearly did not revoke the Family Trust or the 
Restatement, as is required by the documents7 plain language to effectuate a 
complete divestment.") (R. at 628). By the plain language of the settlor's trust, 
8 "The interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to 
divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other 
than by death." (R. at 623). 
9 "The interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest which shall continue until 
37 
she elected to prevent herself from completely divesting a beneficiary's interest 
unless she revoked the trust. 
C. The issues raised by Randy which relate to Utah Code Annotated Section 
75-7-605 and -606 are not properly before this Court; further, even if 
before this Court such provisions do not trump the plain language of the 
trust and do not dictate the result asserted by Randy. 
Randy next argues that this plain-language interpretation means nothing 
because the Utah Legislature has trumped the plain-language interpretation. 
(Brief of Randy at 19). Although this argument also fails on the merits, of 
preliminary importance is Randy's failure to preserve this issue below, failure to 
attempt to show that the issue was preserved below, or show why an exception 
would exist to the rule requiring preservation of issues. 
Ron has already outlined the preservation rule above. The case law arising 
out of Rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, is clear and unyielding: 
claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal unless the 
appellant shows exceptional circumstances or plain error. The issue of whether 
"the Utah Legislature has effectively overruled Banks by requiring only 
substantial compliance to amend a revocable trust," (Brief of Randy at 12,13,16, 
19-20,22,23,24-26), is therefore not properly before this Court. Nor is the issue 
of whether the Utah Legislature has effectively overruled Banks by providing that 
this Trust is revoked or terminated." (R. at 627). 
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a revocable trust can be amended or revoked by any method manifesting clear 
and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent to amenji or revoke. (Brief of 
Randy at 13,16,19-20,22,23,24-26). 
These issues were not argued or briefed by the plarties in the trial court 
below and accordingly should not be addressed by this Court. Ron had no 
opportunity to consider or argue such issues below, and more importantly, the 
trial court was deprived of that opportunity. Randy cannot hold back these 
issues below only to ambush Ron and this Court with these previously unheard 
issues. 
Nor does Utah Code Annotated Section 75-7-605 even apply to the 
interpretation of the relevant documents here. Section 
the Uniform Trust Code, as adopted by Utah, is not intended to override the 
terms of a trust except in specifically-enumerated circumstances, none of which 
apply here: "Except as specifically provided in this chapter, the terms of a trust 
prevail over any provision of this chapter except: 
105(2). The exceptions were enumerated above, and none of the exceptions 
apply here. Section 75-7-605 therefore does not apply to the question of whether 
75-7-105 makes clear that 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-
the Family Trust and Restatement required Darlene to 
order to completely divest Ron of his interest as a beneficiary. 
revoke said documents in 
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Even if the preservation rule did not bar reference to these statutes, and 
even if the provisions in Section 75-7-605 were not subject to and subsidiary to 
the terms of the trust documents, those provisions still would not provide Randy 
with the relief which he seeks. Randy first argues that the Family Trust and 
Restatement do not make a method of amendment or revocation expressly 
exclusive, so Darlene could amend or revoke by any method showing clear and 
convincing evidence of her intent, and the Final Amendment meets this clear and 
convincing standard. (Brief of Randy at 19-20, 24-27). 
This argument, however, entirely misses the issue at hand, which is 
whether the Final Amendment affected a revocation of the Family Trust and 
Restatement, as required by both in order to completely divest a beneficiary's 
interest. Randy must show that a revocation occurred. It is therefore irrelevant 
whether the Family Trust and Restatement terms outline an expressly exclusive 
method to revoke or amend. A revocation of the trust had to occur, as required 
by the Family Trust and Restatement terms, which provide an express limitation 
on the settlor's ability to completely divest a beneficiary's interest. 
Section 75-7-605(3)(b)(ii) does not turn Darlene's amendment into a 
revocation, and any reading of the statute which does so rests on the faulty 
premise that an amendment is the same as a revocation. This premise is false 
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because a revocation is distinguished from an amendment in ways which are 
critical to the underlying premises of a trust. As discussed above, only 
revocation extinguishes the fiduciary duties under which the trustee performs 
An amendment merely modifies the specific duties of the trustee. A trust 
terminates upon revocation, and all that is left for the trustee is to deliver the 
property as directed by the settlor.10 
The reality that an amendment is not a revocatioln also dispels Randy's 
second statutory argument, which is that the Final Amendment is valid because 
Darlene substantially complied "with a method provided in the terms of the 
trust/7 (R. at 15,42). An amendment does not even purport to be a revocation of 
the trust. A document which is an amendment both in 
cannot substantially comply with the requirements fori 
Randy seems to concede this point as he attemp ts to get around this reality 
with a linguistic leap: "It is respectfully submitted that 
deletes one beneficiary (Ron) is a revocation of the trust "in part" as to the 
deleted beneficiary's (Ron's) rights in the trust." (Brief of Randy at 25). Thus is 
on io The distinction manifests itself in the very Section 
"Upon revocation of a revocable trust, the trustee shalj 
as the settlor directs." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(4) 
75-7-605(2)(a), which allows a trust funded with spousal 
be revoked by either spouse alone but amended only 
jointly. 
name and in function 
affecting a revocation. 
an amendment that 
which Randy relies: 
deliver the trust property 
t also appears in Section 
community property to 
both spouses acting w 
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born the novel but meaningless term "partial revocation/7 But a "partial 
revocation" can only exist in a sphere in which revocation and amendment are 
coterminous in meaning, and they are not. Darlene certainly substantially 
complied with the trust's requirements for amending a trust, but according to the 
terms of the trust, the Final Amendment could not do what it purported to do. 
Having exposed the falsity of the premise that an amendment is the same 
as a revocation, and thereby debunked the idea of a "partial revocation," Randy's 
next assertion reveals the overall weakness of his position: "Darlene 
substantially, if not wholly, complied with the terms of the Trust Restatement to 
amend the trust and revoke Ron's beneficial interest in the trust estate." (Brief of 
Randy at 25) (emphasis added). Ron's beneficial interest, however, "shall 
continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated." (R. at 43). The ultimate 
weakness of Randy's position is that its success depends on rewriting the trust 
language just quoted to read "The interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest 
which shall continue until this Trust [such interest] is revoked or terminated." 
Nothing in Section 75-7-605 modifies the trust language in that way. 
II. THE FINAL AMENDMENT IS INVALID DUE TO DARLENE'S 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH HER OWN TRUST TERMS FOR 
COMPLETELY DIVESTING A BENEFICIARY'S INTEREST, 
Banks and its progeny are sound and well-reasoned law. Section 75-7-605 
is not before this Court and even if it were it would not override the plain 
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language of the Family Trust and Restatement. The trial court was correct in 
ruling that the Final Amendment is void as a matter of law. 
A. The nature of Randy's arguments before this Court manifests the very 
problem which the preservation rule prevents, which is that an appellant 
may withhold an issue below in an attempt to gain posturing on appeal. 
As discussed above, Randy's reliance on the Utah Uniform Trust Code is 
misplaced for various reasons, the first of which is thati Randy failed to preserve 
any issues arising out of Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 and -606 in the trial court 
below. The significance of the preservation rule is illustrated in Randy's present 
attempt to prove his arguments under these Sections. After outlining his 
argument under Section 75-7-605(3) (b)(ii), Randy necessarily reaches a conclusion 
about the settlor's intent: "The intent of Darlene is clear that she wishes to 
remove Ron as beneficiary of the Family Trust." (Brief of Randy at 27). The 
statement is infuriating because it is preceded by this stated premise: "In this 
case, and for purposes of the parties' respective motiohs for partial summary 
judgment, Darlene's intent in executing the May 30,2006 Final Amendment is 
undisputed;" the statement is also preceded by a recitation of those facts which 
were deemed irrelevant to the Banks issue by the trial Court below. (Brief of 
Randy at 26). 
In effect, Randy would have this Court conclude as a matter of law that 
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there is clear and convincing evidence of Darlene's intent in executing the Final 
Amendment (never mind the intent evidenced by the Family Trust and 
Restatement), which issue was not addressed in any meaningful way below 
because it was irrelevant to the issues raised below. This is the quintessential 
problem which the preservation rule addresses. It prevents an appellant from 
reserving issues below to gain posture and surprise on appeal. 
B. The intent of Darlene, as evidenced by the plain language of the Family 
Trust and Restatement is clear in requiring that complete divestment can 
only occur through revocation of the trust. 
Randy also asserts that the changes incorporated by Utah's adoption of the 
Uniform Trust Code are designed to be "intent furthering/' implying that the 
codification of the Uniform Trust Code mandates the application of a new rule of 
construction. It has already been shown, however, that the Uniform Trust Code 
merely acts as a default where the terms of a trust do not speak. 
Moreover, Randy conveniently picks and chooses among the "intents" 
which he would further, electing to look to the intent he perceives in the Final 
Amendment, but asking the Court to ignore the intent of both the Family Trust 
and the Restatement that a beneficiary's interest may only be eliminated through 
the revocation of the trust. Utah trust law has always focused its inquiry on the 
intent of the trustor, Leggroan v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 232 P.2d 746, 749 
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(1951); it is not in Randy's interest, however, to focus o^ i the intent of the trustor 
as manifested in the Family Trust and Restatement. 
In addition, Utah Code Annotated Section 75-7-1103(2) makes clear that 
any "rule of construction" announced in the Uniform Trust Code is subsidiary to 
a clear manifestation of contrary intent in the terms of the trust: "Any rule of 
construction or presumption provided in this chapter applies to trust instruments 
executed before July 1,2004 unless there is a clear indication of a contrary intent in the 
terms of the trust/' (emphasis added). Again, the trust terms are paramount. 
Here, the terms of the Family Trust and Restatement could not speak more 
clearly in requiring that the termination of a beneficiary's interest may only be 
done through revocation of the trust as a whole. This is not the elevation of form 
over substance; it is the necessary recognition of the supstance of the terms of the 
Family Trust and Restatement. 
C. It is not the nature of a remainder beneficiary's [interest which is critical to 
this case, it is the limit which Darlene placed or^  her ability to completely 
divest such interest. 
Randy again returns to the nature of a remaindet beneficiary's interest as 
he argues that Ron's interest was merely an expectancy, that it should be treated 
no differently than an expectancy under a will, and therefore any trust limitation 
on the power to completely divest an interest is without meaning. (Brief of 
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Randy at 27-29). Randy's focus on the nature of a remainder beneficiary's 
interest is again misplaced. As already shown above, the operative language of 
the Family Trust and Restatement—placing a limitation on the settlor's ability to 
completely divest a beneficiary's interest—is not that language which identifies 
the interest as being "present" or "vested." It is the language which states that 
such interest "shall continue until this Trust is revoked." Whether phrased as a 
"present interest," a "presently existing interest," or an "expectancy," the result is 
the same. Randy's argument therefore breaks down, as it rests on the 
assumption that the result in Banks only arose through a misunderstanding of the 
meaning of the phrase "presently vested interests." This misunderstanding, 
however, continues in Randy's next argument. 
Randy argues (without citation to the purportedly relevant sections of the 
Family Trust or any case or statute for support) that Darlene Patterson "was the 
only beneficiary of the Family Trust who had an absolute, unconditional, 
completed, and consummated right to use any portion (or all) of the Family Trust 
estate." (Brief of Randy, pg. 29). Randy then assumes that Ron's (and this 
Court's) reading of the Family Trust "ignores the very definition of the term 
"vested," and defies logic." (Brief of Randy, pg. 30). What Randy ignores is the 
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language of the case law set forth by this Court.11 This Court did not, as Randy 
repeatedly argues, simply rely on the "presently vested" language of the Trust in 
deciding Banks. Instead, this Court made it clear that "a settlor has the power to 
modify or revoke a trust only if and to the extent that such power is explicitly 
reserved by the terms of the trust/' Banks, 2002 UT 65, h| 9, 52 R3d 1190. 
After reviewing the language of the Trust in Banks, (identical to the 
language of the Family Trust), this Court stated as follows: 
Section 3.2 reads, "Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the 
beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to divestment 
which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other 
than by death." By the plain language of the trust, the beneficiaries 
have "vested interests" that continue until the irtoests are 
"revoked or terminated." Here, Ms. Banks reserved the power to 
revoke, modify, or amend the trust in whole or in part in section 3.1, 
but limited that power in section 3.2 with regard to the beneficiaries. 
Thus, a complete revocation was required to divpst the beneficiaries 
of their vested interests. 
Id. at % 12. The exact same principles that were applied in Banks apply here. Ron 
is not claiming, as Randy suggests, that he had an absolute, unconditional, 
completed, and consummated right to the trust property. Instead, Ron is 
claiming that the Family Trust and Restatement only allowed the settlor to 
n In addition, Randy makes this argument only in reference to the language of 
the Family Trust, ignoring the absence of the word "vested" in the Restatement. 
He also ignores the fact that neither the Family Trust nor the Restatement refer to 
Darlene as the "beneficiaries," instead referring to her jas the "Undersigned" and 
"Trustee." (R. at 13,15). 
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completely divest the remainder beneficiaries' interests if the entire trust was 
revoked. The trust was not revoked. 
Contrary to Randy's assertion that the plain language of the Family Trust 
and Restatement produce an illogical result, the only illogical reading is one 
which abandons the plain language. The reasoning of Banks is solid. Randy 
argues that it is absurd for a settlor to reserve the right to amend, modify or 
revoke but to place restrictions on the power to amend. Even if this was absurd, 
a settlor would have the right to so restrict her power to amend. Randy, in 
arguing otherwise, ignores the principles of trust law set forth in Banks and its 
progeny. 
If a grantor/trustee is not bound by the terms of the Family Trust, no trust 
relationship exists. Randy acknowledges that "[i]f a grantor reserves a power to 
modify the trust only in a particular manner or under particular circumstances, 
she can modify the trust only in that manner or under those circumstances/' (R. 
at 430). The trust may only be interpreted according to its plain language, and 
there is no other indication of the settlor's intent than the words of the trust. The 
children had a definite interest that was only terminable according to the terms of 
the Family Trust and Restatement. Although the interests of the children could 
"evaporate at the whim of the settlor," the settlor still had to comply with trust 
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provisions for revocation in order to cause those interests to evaporate. If the 
settlor was not so bound, then no trust existed. 
Finally, such a restriction on the power to amend is not absurd. Indeed, by 
providing that beneficiaries' interests may only be completely divested by 
complete revocation of the trust, the settlor appears to have concluded that 
complete divestiture of a child's interest was a significant enough event that it 
should be accompanied by the deliberateness and formality of a complete 
revocation of the original trust and implementation of an entirely new trust 
agreement. A settlor is entitled to place such limitations on revocation. Such a 
limit would be a logical way for the settlor to ensure that she did not completely 
divest one of her children of their interest in the trust without serious 
contemplation. 
D. Randy's attempt to sway the Court with charged facts is misguided; the 
clear terms of the Family Trust and Restatement prevail and equity does 
not favor Randy's position. 
Randy's last attempt to undermine the plain language of the Family Trust 
and Restatement is an inappropriate reference to facts1^ which he believes 
support a claim of equity under general contract law: under these 
12 Ron has vigorously objected to Randy's reference to such facts and 
incorporates those prior objections herein. In addition] if all equitable 
considerations were before this Court, Randy would likely not make his claim for 
equity as boldly as he does now. ' 
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circumstances, it would be wholly inequitable for the court to award Ron an 
interest in the trust estate . . . . equity demands an interpretation of Paragraph 3.2 
consistent with the foregoing portions of this Memorandum/7 (Brief of Randy at 
31). 
This reference to "general contract law/7 although unsupported by any 
authority evidencing that a trust should be so interpreted, is also unavailing. 
Under contract law, the language of the contract is paramount and "the parties 
intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language77 
unless the language of the contract is ambiguous. Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, f^ 
10, 225 P.3d 185. Randy has not argued or shown that any ambiguity exists. 
In essence, Randy's claim of "equity77 distills down to the fact that he does 
not like the result mandated by the plain language of the Family Trust and 
Restatement. This observation arises from the conspicuous absence in Randy's 
argument to any principle of equity which would mandate the result he seeks 
herein. (Brief of Randy at 31-32). If Randy were to be successful in his reference 
to equity, he would need to cite to a principle of equity which supports the result 
he seeks. He fails to cite to any such principle, nor did he identify any specific 
equitable principle before the trial court. 
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E. As the trial court found, Banks is not distinguishable from this case and 
its holding controls the interpretation of the Fai[nily Trust and 
Restatement. 
Randy's final attack on the trial court's ruling is an attempt to distinguish 
Banks from the current case. His first point merely repeats his argument that 
revocation is the same as amendment. In support of this argument, he notes the 
absence in the Restatement of language requiring that upon revocation the 
trustee shall deliver the trust property to the settlor, and then notes that the 
Court in Banks used the presence of such a provision td support its conclusion 
that revocation was different than amendment. (Brief of Randy at 33). There are 
at least two flaws in Randy's reasoning: first, the already-noted differences 
between amendment and revocation that exist as a matter of trust law, whether 
or not specified in the terms of the trust. The second flaw is the fact that the 
Court in Flake and Hoggan did not even refer to the portion of the Banks opinion 
cited by Randy. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78,169 P.3d 750; Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589. 
Amendment is not the same as revocation, regardless pf whether the trust 
instructs the trustee to deliver property to the settlor upon revocation.13 
13 It is interesting to note that the very statute upon which Randy relies, Section 
75-7-605, expressly states the essence of what Randy claims is critically absent 
from the Restatement: "Upon revocation of a revocable trust, the trustee shall 
deliver the trust property as the settlor directs/' Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(4). 
This is only logical, as once the trust is revoked, the trustee has no right to legal 
title and must deliver the property as directed by the settlor. 
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The principles upon which Randy attempts to distinguish Banks actually 
make Banks even more on point. He notes that the Banks Court looked to the 
purpose of the trust, which was to provide for Ms. Banks and her children 
thereafter. Banks, 2002 UT 65, «f 11 n.5, 52 P.3d 1190. If the Banks Court had 
honored the divesting amendment, notwithstanding the plain language of the 
original trust, it would have nullified that stated purpose of the trust. Randy 
misleads the Court in stating that the Final Amendment here "completely 
restated the beneficiaries of the trust and does not require any of the Trust 
Restatements language to be rendered null and void." (Brief of Randy at 34). To 
the contrary, the Final Amendment is brief and does not completely restate the 
Family Trust; it states that it merely amends the Family Trust. (R. at 58) ("I . . . 
hereby amend The Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust dated July 30,1999 
. . . . " ) . This language of the Final Amendment shows that Darlene considered 
the purposes of the initial Family Trust to still be in place. Those purposes were 
identical to those in Banks: "This Trust is established for the primary benefit of 
the Undersigned during the Undersigned's lifetime, for the Undersigned's family 
thereafter." (R. at 13). The "Undersigned's family" is defined as her spouse and 
all her children, including Ron and his 6 siblings. Of all the modifications 
Darlene ever made to the Family Trust, the only modification which went 
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contrary to her intent to benefit her entire family was tlJLe Final Amendment. 
Randy's attempt to distinguish Banks is unavailing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ron respectfully requests that the Court uphold 
the decision of the trial court below, which determined that the Final 
Amendment is void and does not control the distribution of the assets of 
Darlene's estate. 
DATED and SIGNED this j ^ _ day of July 2010. 
LEB ARON & JENSEN, P.G 
AffcL ^ 
L. Miles LeBaron 
Jacob D. Briggs 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Brief for Appellee at Addendum II, Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589 




THE ALMON «J. FLAKE FAMILY TRUST 
A 1 mon i3 Fl ake hereby amends and restates in full The Almon 
.
T
, Flake Family Trust dated September 22, 1987 and signed by 
Almon J. Flake as Trustor and Trustee This Restatement shall be 
effects ;rQ, as i)f the date of its execution! 
ARTICLE I 
TRANSFER INTO TRUS^ 
A Transfer of Property. For valuable consideration, I, 
the Trustor, Almon J. Flake, of Centerville, Utah, hereby 
transfer and deliver to the Trustee and the successor Trustees 
the property listed in the Property List (Schedule A ) , annexed 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference. The Trustee is to 
hold the property, and any other property|which the Trustee may 
at any time hereafter hold or acquire, for the uses and purposes 
and upon the terms and conditions set forth herein. All of such 
property is referred to collectively as the "Trust Estate." 
B. Present and Future Property. It is specifically my 
intention that all real and personal properties now owned and 
later acquired by me are to automatically be a part of this 
Trust. I, or any other person, may grant to the Trust additional 
real and personal property. However, the Trustee may decline to 
accept such property by sending written notice of nonacceptance 
to such grantor by first class mail addressed to the last known 
address of such grantor or delivered to such grantor :r. cerson. 
ARTICLE II 
REVOCATION AND AMENDMENT 
I reserve the right to amend or revoke this Trust in whole 
or in part. Such amendment or revocation shall be by written 
instrument and shall be effective upon the signing thereof by me 
without notice to any successor Trustee. At my death this Trust 
shall be an irrevocable trust and will be administered and 
distributed as set forth herein. While this Trust remains 
revocable, I reserve the right to make such use of the funds and 
properties of the Trust as I may deem prudent. Such use shall be 
deemed to have been made with the consent and approval of the 
Trustee. 
ARTICLE III 
LOCATION OF DOCUMENTS 
This Trust has been prepared in duplicate, each copy of 
which has been executed as an original. One of these executed 
originals is in my possession. I have deposited the other 
original for safekeeping with my attorney, David Ray Carver, at 
his office in Kaysville, Utah. Either of these copies rr.ay be 
used as an original without the other. If only one copy of this 
Trust Agreement can be found then it shall be considered as the 





If I have a serious illness or operation, I request that the 
Trustee call my attorney, David Ray Carver, to obtain 
instructions concerning this Trust. If my death makes this prior 
conversation impossible then the Trusted should call the attorney 
as soon my death is possible. 
ARTICLE V 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
A* Certified Copies. To the same effect as if it were the 
original, any person or institution may rely upon a ». py 
certified by a Notary Public to be a true copy of this Agreement 
and any schedules or exhibits attached hereto. 
B. Present Interests. The interest of the beneficiaries is 
a present interest which shall continue until- this Trust is 
revoked or terminated. 
C. Spendthrift Provision. After a|ny of the trusts created 
herein becomes irrevocable, the interests of each beneficiary in 
income and principal of the trust shall be free from the control 
or interference of any creditor of such beneficiary, the spouse 
of a married beneficiary, and the parent of a child beneficiary, 
and shall not be subject to attachment or assignment either 
voluntarily or involuntarily. 
D. Rule Against Perpetuities Savings Clause. In any event, 
this Trust shall terminate not later than twenty-one (21) years 
3 
after the death of the last survivor of the group composed of
 m 
and those of my descendants living at my death. The property 
held in trust shall be discharged of any trust and shall 
immediately vest in and be distributed to the persons then 
entitled to the income. For this purpose only it shall be 
presumed that any person entitled to receive any discretionary 
payments from the income or principal of any particular trust is 
entitled to receive the full income and that anv class of persons 
so entitled is entitled to receive all such property, to be 
divided among them equally per stirpes. No power of appointment 
granted hereunder shall be so exercised as to violate any 
applicable Rule Against Perpetuities, accumulations, or any 
similar rule or law. Any attempted exercise of any power which 
violates such rule or law shall be void, notwithstanding any 
provision of this Trust to the contrary. 
E. Trust Contest. If any beneficiary under this Trust 
shall, directly or indirectly, contest this Trust or any of its 
respective parts or provisions, any share or interest given to 
that beneficiary shall be revoked and augment proportionately the 
shares of the beneficiaries that have not joined or participated 
in the contest. 
F. Invalidity. If any provision of this Trust Agreement is 
unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall, nevertheless, be 
carried into effect. 
G. Gender. In all provisions of this Trust Agreement, the 
masculine includes the feminine and the neuter and vice versa. 
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Where applicable, the singular includes the plural and vice 
versa. 
H. Natural and Adopted, Whenever used herein, the terms 
"issue," "child," "children" and "descendants" include those 
natural and adopted. The term descendants means the same as the, 
term issue. 
I. Jurisdiction. This Agreement shall be construed and 
regulated by the laws of the State of Utah. 
ARTICLE VI 
TRUSTEE PROVISIONS 
A. Parties Dealing with Trustee Protected. No purchaser or 
issuer of any stock, bond or other instrument evidencing a 
deposit of money or property, or other Iperson dealing with the 
Trustee with respect to any property hereunder, shall be under 
I j 
any obligation to see to the disbursing of money or other 
property delivered to the Trustee or to the due execution of this 
Trust in any particular. Such persons shall be absolutely free 
in dealing with the Trustee as though the Trustee were the 
absolute owner of the property. Everyone dealing with the 
Trustee shall be absolutely protected in relying upon the 
certificate of any Trustee as to the extent of the Trustee's 
authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise. 
B. Insurance. In the event the Trust is named a 
beneficiary under any policy of insurance, the ]rustee shall hold 
the policy, subject to order of the owner of the policy. The 
Trustee shall have no obligation regarding any insurance policy 
other than the safekeeping of any policy which may be delivered 
to the Trustee. The owner of the policy retains all rights, 
options and privileges with respect to the policy. Upon proof
 0f 
death of the insured, or upon maturity of the policy prior to the 
death of the insured, the Trustee shall use reasonable efforts to 
collect all sums payable on the policy for which the Trust is 
designated a beneficiary or owner. All insurance proceeds 
received by the Trustee shall become principal of the Trust 
Estate, except interest paid by the insurer, which shall be 
classed as income. 
C. Bond. No Trustee named herein need give bond in any 
jurisdiction. If a fiduciary's bond may not be dispensed with, I 
request that the bond be accepted without surety and in the 
lowest possible amount. 
D. Majority Decision. Whenever more than one Trustee is 
designated to act concurrently, a majority of the Trustees shall 
have the power to make any decision, undertake any action, or 
execute any documents affecting the trusts created herein. In 
the event of a difference of opinion among the Trustees, the 
decision of the majority of them shall prevail, but a dissenting 
Trustee shall not be responsible for any action taken by the 
majority pursuant to such decision. If only two individual 
Trustees are in office, they must act unanimously. If an 
individual and a corporate Trustee are in office, the 
determination of the individual Trustee shall be binding. 
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E. Prior Trustee Misfeasance. No successor Trustee shall 
be liable for any misfeasance of any prior Trustee. 
F. Resignation. Any Trustee may decline to act or may 
resign as Trustee of any trust by delivering a written 
resignation to the beneficiaries thereof. 
G. Delegation. Any Trustee may, from time to time, 
delegate to any remaining Trustee any powers, duties or 
discretions. Every such-delegation shall be in writing and 
delivered to the delegate or delegates. The delegation shall 
remain effective for the time specified therein or until earlier 
revoked. Such revocation shall be in writing and delivered to 
the delegate or delegates. 
H. Trust Expenses. From the income of the trusts or, if 
that is insufficient, from the principal thereof, the Trustee 
shall pay and discharge all expenses incurred in the 
administration of the trusts. 
I. Compensation. The Trustee shall be entitled to 
reasonable compensation for services rendered by the Trustee or 
counsel retained by the Trustee, including services in connection 
with the transfer of assets to beneficiaries or a successor 
Trustee and the appointment of a successor Trustee. 
J. Annual Accounting. With respect to each trust created 
herein, the Trustee shall render at least annually an account of 
income and principal, including a statement of all receipts, 
disbursements and capital changes, to all beneficiaries chen 
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eligible to receive income, or to the natural or legal guardian 
of such beneficiaries. 
ARTICLE VII 
POWERS OF THE TRUSTEE 
The Trustee shall have full power to do everything in 
administering the trusts that they deem to be for the best 
interests of the beneficiaries including, but not limited to, tl 
following: 
A. Investments. To buy, sell and trade in securities. T( 
maintain and operate accounts with brokers. To pledge any 
securities held in trust as security for loans and advances. T< 
buy, sell and trade personal property, real estate, and interest 
therein, including business interests and investments, all 
without diversification as to kind or amount, without being 
limited to investments authorized by law for the investment of 
trust funds. To hold or take title to property in the name of i 
nominee. 
B. Sell Property. To sell, exchange, pledge, or otherwise 
dispose of any real or personal property in such manner and upor 
such terms as they deem appropriate. 
C. Distributions in Kind. To make distributions as 
authorized in this Trust Agreement, including distributions to 
the Trustee, in kind or in money or partly in each, even if 
shares are composed differently. For such purposes, the 
valuation of the Trustee shall be given effect if reas-r.able. 
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D. Distributions to a Special Need Beneficiary. The 
Trustee may, in the sole discretion of the Trustee, distribute 
personal property items to a minor before any age limitations 
outlined in this Trust unless expressly provided otherwise. In 
addition, if the Trustee, in the sole discretion of the Trustee, 
determines that any beneficiary (whether a minor or of legal age) 
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is incapable of making proper disposition of any sum of income or 
principal that is payable or appointed to the beneficiary, the 
Trustee may apply the sum on behalf of the beneficiary by any of 
the following methods: 
1. By payments on behalf of the beneficiary to a 
parent, custodian, guardian, or an adult person with whom 
the beneficiary resides. The Trustee shall not be liable 
for any such payments made. 
2. By payments in discharge of the beneficiary's debts 
or obligations. 
3. By paying an allowance to the beneficiary directly. 
E. Adjustments between Income and Principal. To determine 
whether and to what extent receipts shoi^ ld be deemed income or 
principal, whether and to what extent expenditures should be 
charged against income or principal, and what other adjustments 
should be made between income and principal. Such determinations 
shall be within the well-settled rules therefore. 
F. Agents. To delegate powers to agents, remunerate them 
and pay their expenses, including accountants, investment 
counsel, appraisers, legal counsel, and other experts. To employ 
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custodians of the trust assets, bookkeepers, clerks and other 
assistants. 
G. Legal Documents and Claims. To execute contracts, 
deeds, agreements or any other documents which the Trustee deems 
necessary or desirable. To assign, alter, compromise, release, 
with or without consideration, or submit to arbitration or 
litigation, obligations or claims held by or asserted against m< 
the Trustee, our agents, or the trust assets. 
H. Borrow Money. To borrow money for the payment of taxe 
debts or expenses, or for any other purpose which, in the opini-
of the Trustee, will facilitate the administration of any trust 
created herein. To pledge or mortgage property as security for 
any such loans. To pay reasonable interest on the loan includi 
to any Trustee from which the money may have been borrowed. 
I. Manage Real Estate. To lease, or grant options to 
lease, without regard to statutory restrictions or the probable 
duration of any trust. To erect, demolish, or alter buildings, 
improve and manage property, make repairs, grant easements, 
dedicate roads, subdivide, make party wall contracts, adjust 
boundary lines, partition and convey property or give money foi 
equity of partition. 
J. Business. To operate, either solely or with cchers, i 
business operation or enterprise of any nature for as long a t 
and in such a manner as the Trustee deems proper. To organize 
and operate as a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation 
10 
other legal entity. To execute or join in any plan of 
refinancing, merger, consolidation or reorganization. 
K. Depreciation. To charge to operating expenses all *-
current costs of amortization, obsolescence and depreciation of 
any properties of the Trust and to provide adequate reserves for 
such amortization, obsolescence and depreciation. 
L. Insurance. To effect and keep in force life, fire, 
rent, title, liability, casualty, or other insurance of any 
nature, in any form, and in any amount, 
M. Transactions with other Trusts, To enter into 
transactions with any other trusts in which I or any of the 
beneficiaries of this Trust have beneficial interests, even 
though any trustee of such other trust is also a Trustee under 
this Trust. 
N. Common Funds. To invest in common trust funds. To hold 
and invest the funds of all trusts without a physical division of 
the assets. 
0. Trustee as Interested Party. To exercise all the 
foregoing powers even though the Trustee is personally interested 
in the property that is involved, notwithstanding any rules of 
law relating to divided loyalty or self-dealing. 
ARTICLE VIII 
DISPOSITION DURING MY LIFETIME 
During my lifetime, the Trustee shall hold, manage, and 
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invest the Trust Estate, collect the income, and dispose of the 
net income and principal as follows: 
A. Income and Principal, The Trustee shall pay to me all 
of the net income of this Trust at least semiannually. The 
Trustee may pay or apply for my use and benefit such amounts of 
the principal as the Trustee deems necessary or advisable. 
B. Competency. I shall continue to be deemed mentally 
competent, unless determined not to be competent, by two 
physicians selected by the successor Trustee. The physicians 
shall not be liable for any determination made as to my 
competency if the determination is made in a reasonable manner. 
C. Incapacity. If, in the Trustee's judgment, I am so 
incapacitated by reason of illness, age, or other cause that I ai 
incapable of handling funds for my own use and benefit, or if I 
am unable to give prompt attention to my financial affairs, the 
Trustee may use so much of the net income and principal as the 
Trustee deems necessary or advisable: 
1. For my comfort, support, maintenance, health and 
education and any person who, in the judgment of the 
Trustee, is dependent upon me. 
2. For the discharging of any debt or obligation 
incurred by me and believed by the Trustee to be a valid 
debt including home rental and mortgage payments, utilities 
installment obligations, insurance premiums and establishe< 
charitable contribution customs. 
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ARTICLE IXI 
DISPOSITION AT MY DEATH 
At my death7 after payment of currently due debts, expenses 
and costs of last illness and funeral out of the estate, the 
Trustee shall dispose of the Trust Estate as follows: 
A. Personal Property List. All personal properties listed 
on the attached Personal Property List are to be distributed to 
the named beneficiaries-in addition to their respective 
distributive shares of the Trust Estatp. 
i 
B. Cabin. The cabin shall be distributed by right of 
representation to Joel Almon Flake, Lynette Flake Watts, Connie 
Flake Jackson, and Mark Widdison Flake. If the cabin has been 
transferred to a Limited Liability Company then any interest I 
have in the Limited Liability Company shall be distributed to 
these four (4) beneficiaries by right of representation. 
C. Vehicles. If Marian R. Flake survives me she shall be 
distributed the Cadillac. If Lynette £lake Watts survives me she 
shall be distributed the New Yorker. If either of both of these 
beneficiaries has predeceased me then the vehicle that would have 
been distributed to the decedent shall be distributed with any 
other vehicle I may have as provided in paragraph E below. 
D. Marian R. Flake. If Marian R. Flake survives me, the 
main part of my home (located at 604 East 540 North in 
Centerville) shall be held in a separate trust as a life estate 
for her benefit. The Trust shall pay the following costs 
associated with the property: property insurance, property 
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taxes, electricity, heating fuel, water, and other city 
utilities. Marian R. Flake shall pay all other costs associated 
with the property including telephone charges and maintenance and 
upkeep costs. However, the Trustee shall have discretion to pay 
such part or all of the maintenance costs of the home that the 
Trustee feels is appropriate. 
1. The Trustee may rent out the basement apartment to 
generate funds to tak*> care of the costs of the home. The 
Trustee may also use such other funds in the Trust as may be 
necessary to take care of the costs of the home 
2. This life estate will terminate at the earlier of 
the death of Marian R. Flake, her moving from the home, her 
remarriage or cohabitation, or her prior failure to pay her 
share of the costs associated with the property. 
3. At the termination of this life estate this trust 
shall be distributed as provided in paragraph E below. 
E. Division of Trust Estate. The remainder of the Trust 
Estate shall be divided by the Trustee into as many equal shares 
as I have children then living and children then deceased but 
leaving at least one surviving descendant. Any share set aside 
for the descendants of a deceased child shall be divided among 
the descendants of that child by right of representation. 
1. Each beneficiary that has attained (or when the 
beneficiary does attain) age twenty-one (21) years shall 
have their share distributed to them. 
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2. Until a beneficiary has attained age twenty-one 
(21) years, the share for such beneficiary shall be held in 
a separate trust for the benefit of that beneficiary. Each 
trust may be used for the support and education of the 
beneficiary. Education shall include, but not be limited 
to, musical education, dancing lessons, grammar school, 
secondary school, college, graduate school, trade school and 
vocational training 'school. 
F* Disclaimed and Unclaimed Interests. Except as provided 
otherwise, if any of the above beneficiaries are unable or 
unwilling to take any portion of the Trust Estate then the 
Trustee shall distribute that portion of the property of that 
beneficiary to his or her issue by right of representation and, 
if none, then to "the other beneficiaries proportionate to each 
beneficiary's interest in the Trust. If there are no remaining 
beneficiaries then the Trustee shall distribute the property to 
my living heirs at law in the same priority and distributive 
order as listed in the law of intestate succession of the state 
of Utah as in force on the date of the signing of this Trust 
Agreement. 
G. Contingent Vesting. If any interest in any part of the 
Trust Estate would vest in any person if he or she were alive 
upon the occurrence of any contingency, such as the death of an 
individual or the obtaining a specified age, and that person dies 
under conditions that it would be difficult or impossible to 
determine whether or not he or she was alive upon the occurrence 
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of the contingency, that person shall be deemed to have died 
prior to the occurrence of the contingency. 
ARTICLE X 
FAMILY MEMBERS AND TRUSTEES 
A. Family Members. My wife's name is Marian R. Flake. My 
present living children are: 
Vicki Lynn Flake 
Joel Almon Flake 
Lynette Flake Watts 
Connie Flake Jackson 
Mark Widdison Flake 
B. Trustee. The following people will act as Trustee in 
the following order of succession: 
1. Almon J. Flake. 
2. Joel Almon Flake. 
3. Lynette Flake Watts. 
4. A Trustee chosen by the majority in interest of the 
beneficiaries (in proportion to each beneficiary's interest 
in the Trust Estate). A parent or legal guardian shall be 
entitled to vote for minor beneficiaries. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Trustor has executed this 
Restatement on the ^J £ day of (^^J^/C^ j , 19 ^ ^ , as 
Trustor and Trustee. 
Almon J. FlaTce 
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ss. 
State of Utah 
County of /(/i^/^Qb ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 
10 day of tfr^U^ 19 ff by Almon J. Flake. 
OAVJORAYCAflVER 
NoJcryfciblc 
I I *W. 575 N. KbyMto. W «4037i 
Notary Public/ 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
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